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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1ST OK CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MORRIS H. CURTIS and SADIE P. CURTIS, 
his wife; and UTAH TITLE & ABSTRACT CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff to specifically enforce the 
terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Defendants Curtis counterclaimed, 
asking that the contract be rescinded because of the fraudulent representa-
tions of the president of plaintiff corporation. Defendant Utah Title & Ab-
stract Co. agreed to be bound by the order of the Court regardless of the out-
come between the other parties, since no affirmative relief was asked against it. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and judgment in favor of 
defendants Curtis, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and a new trial. 
No. 14334 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS ^ , 
On January 15, 1972, plaintiff, through its president, Orland Fiandaca, 
entered into an agreement with defendants Morris H. Curtis and Sadie P. 
Curtis for the purchase of land near Salina, Utah (Tr. 97, 98) . When it 
was discovered that additional land would be needed for the use Mr. Fiandaca 
had planned for the property, a new agreement was reached (Ex. P4l ) and 
the old one destroyed (Tr 98-100). Under the date of December 15, 1972, 
the transaction was closed by the parties entering into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Ex. P41A), a Trust Agreement (Ex. P42), a Warranty Deed 
(Ex. P I ) and approving a Closing Statement (Ex. P43). There was a sig-
nificant conflict in the evidence at trial concerning the date that the docu-
ments were signed. Mr. and Mrs. Curtis both testified that they were not 
signed until January 3, 1973 (Tr 73A, 359, 360, 427). However, all other 
witnesses testified that they were signed on December 15, 1972 (Tr 129, 
130, 135, 331, 332, 434), and the Warranty Deed was actually recorded 
on December 15, 1972 (Tr 134, 135, 333). The closing resulted in the 
property being conveyed in trust to Utah Title and Abstract Co., with pay-
ments being made to that entity. Parcels of property were to be released as 
they were paid for under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. A 
dispute arose over whether a payment had been made timely, and on August 
19, 1974, plaintiff filed a Complaint asking for specific performance of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, or damages in the alternative (R 1). Defend-
ants Curtis filed a Counterclaim asking that the contract be rescinded because 
of the fraudulent representations of plaintiff's president, Mr. Fiandaca, or in 
the alternative forfeiture of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R 15). The 
specific representations claimed to be false were: 
(a) That the company was a corporation under the laws of the 
State of Utah and was, therefore, a good buyer, financially sound and able 
to guarantee all of the performances and payments due under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract dated the 15 th day of December, 1972. 
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(b) That Mr. and Mrs. Curtis should not go to an attorney, that 
attorneys were expensive and that they would be properly secured by the 
contract which was drafted in accordance with Mr. Fiandaca's instruction and 
that he would take them to Utah Title and Abstract Co., specialists in real 
property matters, who would make certain that they were adequately secured 
and would suffer no financial injury or damage. 
(c) That Mr. Fiandaca was an expert in developing commercial 
property and that he would effectively negotiate with the State of Utah and 
all other interested persons to make certain that adjoining property retained 
by them would be substantially increased in value, and see that the State of 
Utah granted suitable access rights to a proposed interstate highway so that 
their adjoining properties could be developed for commercial purposes. 
(d) That it would reserve adequate easements and access rights 
to and from the interstate highway for the benefit of their adjacent property. 
(e) That it would reserve for their benefit all gas, oil and min-
eralrights(R 17, 18). 
At the pre-trial (Tr. 3-51) counsel for defendants raised another issue 
that was not in the pleadings, the claim that Mr. Fiandaca had represented 
the property to include only 70 acres, when, in fact, it included 90 acres. 
This had the effect of postponing the trial from its initially scheduled trial 
date of June 23, 1975, to July 14, 1975. On the morning of the first day of 
the trial, counsel for defendants Curtis, for the first time, raised the issue of 
a confidential or fiduciary relationship existing between Mr. Fiandaca and 
Mr. and Mrs. Curtis. This was raised by the proposed instructions (R 48) 
submitted by counsel for those defendants during a conference with the Trial 
Judge. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the raising of this new issue (Tr. 431). 
He also took exception to Instructions 14, 15, 16, 17 and Interrogatory No. 
1, 2, 3 and 4 (Tr. 445), each of which dealt with or discussed the issue of 
confidential relationship. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i t ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ISSUE WAS RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON THE OPENING DAY OF TRIAL. 
Where an issue has not been framed in either the pleadings or the Pre-
Trial Order, it is improper to allow the issue to be raised over the objection 
of opposing counsel. Youngren vs. John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 
22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, 
Inc. vs. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 152, 460 P.2d 321 (1969). See also Case vs. 
Abrams, 152 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1965). . 
Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), citing Stuck vs. 
Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791 (1924), outlines the 
nine essential elements of actionable fraud, and holds that the burden of 
proving those elements is on the party alleging such fraud. The instructions 
and interrogatories to the jury covering confidential relationship, however, 
completely changed that burden of proof and the jury's attitude toward the 
entire case. Those instructions and interrogatories are: 
Instruction No. 14 
You are instructed that a confidential relationship may exist 
between two parties where one party places trust and confidence 
in the other concerning his business, economic or financial affairs. 
The person in whom that trust or confidence is placed is some-
times called a "fiduciary/' A "fiduciary" relationship and a "con-
fidential" relationship are the same thing. 
In order to have a confidential relationship the person plac-
ing trust or confidence in the other must not only have a high 
regard for that person's ability and knowledge in a certain field, 
but he must also rely upon that confidence in entering into trans-
actions of a business, financial, or economic nature in the same 
area or field. A person in order to be the fiduciary of another 
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must possess a superior knowledge of the subject matter of the 
relationship between the parties, believing that the advice given 
him by the fiduciary will operate to his benefit, must rely upon said 
advice, instruction, recommendations, or suggestions given to him 
by the fiduciary so as to create a duty on the part of the fiduciary 
to observe the confidence, and it must result in a situation where 
there is superior influence on one side and dependence on the other 
and substitution of the will of the fiduciary for that of the other 
party in the transaction. 
You are further instructed that the party claiming the exist-
ence of the confidential relationship has the burden of proving 
the foregoing elements of that relationship by a preponderance 
of the evidence (R 76). 
Instruction No. 15 
You are instructed that a fiduciary, or a person in whom 
another has placed trust or confidence, cannot profit by that rela-
tionship without the complete knowledge and consent of the other 
party, fully disclosed to him by the fiduciary. 
You are further instructed that if a fiduciary or a person oc-
cupying a confidential relationship to another, enters into a bus-
iness transaction between himself and that other person concerning 
the same subject matter as the one upon which the confidence is 
based, the transaction must be entirely fair or it will be declared 
void by the courts at the election of the person damaged. 
You are further instructed that the fiduciary in such cases 
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, as 
that term has been explained to you in these instructions, that the 
transaction was in all respects fair and fully disclosed by the fidu-
ciary to the other party (R 77). 
Instruction No. 16 
Therefore, if you find from the evidence that Mr. and Mrs. 
Morris H. Curtis had reason to place and, in fact, placed trust and 
confidence in Or land Fiandaca of 1st OK Corporation and made 
him their fiduciary as the term has been explained to you in In-
struction No. 14, in matters pertaining to either the value of their 
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land, the best way to dispose of it, manage, or develop it, or relied 
upon his descriptions of their property or Mr. Fiandaca's statements 
or suggestions concerning the amount of acreage involved in their 
transactions with Mr. Fiandaca, or relied upon his recommendations 
of ways to enter into contracts with respect to their land by a means 
that he declared would be advantageous to the Curtises, you will 
find that a confidential relationship existed between them. 
Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
those elements of a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed 
with respect to any contract entered into, then it will be your 
further duty to determine whether or not the agreement or agree-
ments were entered into between the parties as a result of reliance 
placed by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis upon the advice, suggestions or 
recommendations of Mr. Fiandaca. If you find that any such agree-
ments were entered into by Curtises in reliance upon that advice, 
suggestions, or recommendation, then you must determine whether 
or not such agreement or agreements were in all respects fair to 
the Curtises and all advantage to be received by Mr. Fiandaca or 
his 1st OK Corporation fully disclosed to Curtises before the con-
tract in question was entered into. 
If, in your opinion, Mr. Fiandaca has not proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the contract or contracts entered 
into under that reliance were fair to Mr. and Mrs. Curtis or that 
the advantage to Mr. Fiandaca or the disadvantage to Mr. and 
Mrs. Curtis was not fully disclosed by Mr. Fiandaca prior to enter-
ing into that contract, or contracts, you are instructed to find any 
such agreement void (R 78). 
Instruction No. 17 
You are instructed that if an agreement is procured by fraud 
and misrepresentation that it is voidable at the option of the per-
son injured. 
Before you can find fraud or misrepresentation sufficient to 
nullify a contract, you must find clear and convincing evidence 
of each of the following elements: 
1. That there was a representation of a presently existing 
material fact. 
2. That the representation was untrue. 
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3. That the person making the representation knew the same 
to be false or made the representation recklessly, knowing that he 
had insufficient knowledge or information upon which to base such 
representation, or that said representation was made with an un-
concern or disregard as to whether it was true or false. 
4. That the representation was made for the purpose of in-
ducing the other party to act in reliance on it. 
5. That the other party reasonably had the right to rely upon 
said representation, and acting responsibly and being ignorant of 
their falsity, did rely upon said representation; and 
6. That the person relying thereupon suffered damage. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the elements of fraud must 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence and that Mr. and Mrs. 
Curtis have the burden of proving clearly and convincingly that 
the foregoing elements existed. 
However, you are nevertheless instructed that if you find from 
the preponderance of the evidence that a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendants, as that 
relationship has been explained to you in these instructions, and 
that any contract was induced or influenced by that relationship 
and that the plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the contract was fair to Mr. and Mrs. Curtis or 
that Mr. Fiandaca fully and fairly disclosed to Mr. and Mrs. Curtis 
any advantage to him and any disadvantage to them, then that find-
ing alone will be sufficient to sustain a verdict in favor of the 
defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Curtis, and against plaintiff, 1st OK 
Corporation, and it is not necessary that Mr. and Mrs. Curtis prove 
the elements of fraud and undue influence as they have been enum-
erated in this instruction (R 79,80). 
Interrogatory 1: Do you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that a confidential relationship, as that term has been 
explained to you in Instruction No. 13, existed at the time of 
the first preliminary agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Curtis and 
Orland Fiandaca of 1st OK Corporation concerning the land owned 
by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis (R 84) ? 
Interrogatory 2: If your answer to the foregoing interroga-
tory is "yes," do you find that Mr. Fiandaca and 1st OK Corporation 
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have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
preliminary agreement between the parties was fair to Mr. and Mrs. 
Curtis? (If you find the agreement was made as the result of a 
confidential relationship between the parties, you are to answer 
"yes" to this question unless the plaintiff has carried the burden 
of proving the contract was fair.) 
Interrogatory 3: If your answer to interrogatory number one 
is "yes," do you find that 1st OK Corporation has failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that any profit or advantage 
of Mr. Fiandaca or 1st OK Corporation or any disadvantage to Mr. 
and Mrs. Curtis in the first preliminary agreement was fully and 
completely disclosed by Mr. Fiandaca before it was entered into? 
(If you find that Mr. Fiandaca received any advantage and the 
Curtises any disadvantage by the first preliminary agreement and 
plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that such advantage or disadvantage was fully and fairly disclosed 
by Mr. Fiandaca before the agreement was entered into, you are 
to answer this interrogatory "yes.") 
Interrogatory 4: Do you find from the evidence that on or 
before January 21, 1972, Mr. Fiandaca sought and obtained an 
amendment to the previous agreement between the parties by 
which amendment he obtained or would have obtained rights in 
an additional 40 acres of land owned by Mr. and Mrs. Curtis while 
failing to disclosed that face [fact] or while representing to de-
fendants or allowing them to believe Mr. Fiandaca was obtaining 
rights in only an addition[al] 20 acres of land (R 85)? 
Thus, the issue of confidential relationship became the single most im-
portant issue of the case, to the surprise of plaintiff. Plaintiff had no prior 
notice of the issue, had no opportunity to conduct discovery with reference 
to the issue and had no opportunity to request instructions or interrogatories 
on the issue. The instructions also left out one important element of the cre-
ation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship is 
established only when it is shown that the confidence reposed by one person 
was actually accepted by the other, and merely reposing confidence in another 
may not, of itself, create the relationship. 36A C.J.S., Fiduciary, p. 385. 
There was no evidence at trial that Mr. Fiandaca had accepted a fiduciary 
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relationship. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. To support the finding 
of the Court, one must believe that a fiduciary relationship was created be-
tween Mr. Fiandaca and Mr. and Mrs. Curtis on their very first meeting, 
January 15, 1972. Such a finding is wholly unreasonable. The practical ef-
fect of the above quoted instructions and interrogatories, therefore, was to 
direct a verdict in favor of defendant Curtis on the issue of confidential rela-
tionship, an issue that had not been previously raised. The error in submitting 
that issue to the jury was so substantial and prejudicial that plaintiff was de-
prived of a fair trial, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would 
have been different in absence of such error. In this instance, therefore, the 
trial court should be reversed. Batt vs. State, 28 Utah 417, 503 P.2d 855 
(1972); Calahan vs. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 (1970); Hall vs. 
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164,417 P.2d 664 (1966). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS CURTIS NEITHER ALLEGED NOR PROVED 
THE ELEMENTS OF ACTIONABLE FRAUD. 
Pace vs. Parrish, supra, establishes the nine essential elements of action-
able fraud. They are: (1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning 
a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the rep-
resentor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that 
he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) 
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did, in fact, rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
The matters raised in the counterclaim of defendants Curtis, at the pre-trial, 
do not fall within the category of representations of presently existing material 
facts. They are promises to do something in the future. It was error, there-
fore, for the Trial Court to submit those issues to the jury and deny plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
The effect of the Trial Court's error has been to ignore the issue of 
unconscionable forfeiture, and to effectively deprive plaintiff of the value 
of 40% of the time of Mr. Fiandaca for three and one-half years (Tr. 189), 
and a loss of value due principally to the work and expertise of Mr. Fiandaca 
of $495,000 (Tr. 281). The judgment of the Trial Court should, therefore, 
be reversed and plaintiff be granted a new trial, at which plaintiff will have 
had the opportunity to prepare for and meet all of the issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
By John H. Allen : i 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
* • ' ( • • ' . ' ] : . ? ; : • \ > " • • ' . • . - ' • ' . - ' f \ . . 
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